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Building on Eaton and Kortum's (2002) model of Ricardian trade, Alvarez and Lucas (2005) calculate
that a small country representing 1% of the world's GDP experiences a gain of 41% as it goes from
autarky to frictionless trade with the rest of the world. But the gains from openness, which includes
not only trade but all the other ways through which countries interact, are arguably much higher than
the gains from trade. This paper presents and then calibrates a model where countries interact through
trade as well as diffusion of ideas, and then quantifies the overall gains from openness and the role
of trade in generating these gains. Having the model match the trade data (i.e., the gravity equation)
and the observed growth rate is critical for this quantification to be reasonable. The main result of
the paper is that, compared to the model without diffusion, the gains from openness are much larger
(206%-240%) and the gains from trade are smaller (13%-24%) when diffusion is included in the model.
This last result is a consequence of a novel feature of the model, namely that trade and diffusion are
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How much does a country gain from its relationship with the rest of the world? Consider
for example the recent work by Alvarez and Lucas (2005), who build on Eaton and Kortum￿ s
(2002) model of Ricardian trade. According to their quantitative model, a small country like
Argentina, which represents approximately 1% of the world￿ s GDP, experiences an income gain
of 41% as it goes from autarky to frictionless trade with the rest of the world. But the gains
from openness, which includes not only trade but all the other ways through which countries
interact, are arguably much higher than the gains from trade. Even if a country were to shut
down trade, it could still bene￿t from foreign ideas through foreign direct investment (FDI),
migration, books, journals, the Internet, etc.
The goal of this paper is to construct and calibrate a model where countries interact through
trade and di⁄usion of ideas, and then to quantify the overall gains from openness and the role
of trade in generating these gains. The main result is that the gains from trade are smaller than
those quanti￿ed by Alvarez and Lucas (between 13% and 24% rather than 41% for a country
with 1% of the world￿ s GDP) whereas the gains from openness are relatively large (between
206% and 240% for a country with 1% of the world￿ s GDP). An implication is that shutting
down trade would generate loses that are quite small in comparison to the loses that would arise
if the country were to become completely isolated by shutting down both trade and di⁄usion.
Calculating the gains from trade in a model that allows for trade and di⁄usion represents a
signi￿cant departure from the standard practice in the literature, which is to consider trade as
the only means through which countries interact. This alternative approach has at least two
advantages. First, having both trade and di⁄usion in the model shows that the gains from trade
depend on the way in which trade and di⁄usion interact. In the model I present here, trade
and di⁄usion are both substitutes and complements. They are substitutes in that if a country
cannot import a good then it may adopt a foreign technology for domestic production, and if
a country cannot use a foreign technology then it may import the goods produced abroad with
that technology.1 They are complements in that stronger di⁄usion of ideas from rich to poor
countries increases the share of goods that will be produced in the later countries, expanding
trade. Indeed, the tremendous expansion of exports from China over recent decades can be seen
1This result is similar to the substitutive property between trade and factor ￿ ows (Mundell, 1957), or trade
and multinational production (see Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Head and Riess (2004) for recent
treatments).
1as the result of this country bene￿ting from increased transfers of technology from rich countries.
In the calibrated model, and focusing on the implications of trade and di⁄usion for advanced
countries, the ￿rst channel (substitution) dominates the second one (complementarity), so
trade and di⁄usion behave as substitutes. This implies that shutting down trade in this model
leads to smaller losses than in models with no di⁄usion such as Eaton and Kortum (2002) and
Alvarez and Lucas (2005).
A second advantage from studying di⁄usion and trade together is that one can compare the
gains from trade with the overall gains from openness, and this may provide a way to judge
whether the numbers are reasonable. The usual reaction of economists to the calculated gains
from trade in quantitative models is that they are "too small." Apparently, economists have
a prior belief that these gains are much higher, so there has been a search for mechanisms
through which trade can have a larger e⁄ect, such as scale e⁄ects, intra-industry reallocations
or gains from increased variety. But the result of this search has generally been disappointing
(see Tybout, 2003). This paper suggests that the reason for this may be that the gains from
trade are in fact "small," while economists￿priors about large gains may in fact be about the
overall gains from openness. More importantly, this strategy may have relevant implications for
research and policy regarding how countries integrate with the rest of the world. In particular,
the result of this paper that the gains from trade appear to be quite small relative to the overall
gains from openness suggests that both research and policy should at least partially redirect
their attention from trade to all the other ways through which countries interact. More attention
should be devoted, for example, to understanding the importance of FDI and migration in the
international exchange of ideas, and to think about policies that countries can follow to speed
up the adoption of foreign technologies.
In Eaton and Kortum￿ s (2002) model of Ricardian trade with no di⁄usion, countries gain
from openness through specialization according to comparative advantage. In the model I
construct here, countries also gain from di⁄usion of ideas. Both the gains from trade and
the gains from di⁄usion come from the same basic phenomenon, namely the sharing of the
best ideas across countries. Consider, for example, Japan￿ s superior technology for producing
automobiles. This technology can be shared through trade by having Japan export automobiles
or through di⁄usion by having other countries produce their own automobiles using Japan￿ s
technology. In both cases, thanks to the non-rivalry of ideas emphasized by Romer (1990),
sharing ideas leads to an increase in worldwide income.
2These gains from sharing ideas are the same ones that give rise to aggregate increasing
returns to scale in models of quasi-endogenous growth such as Jones (1995) and Kortum (1997).
Consider Kortum (1997). In the simplest version of this model, the arrival of new ideas is
proportional to the population level and the quality of each idea is drawn from an unchanging
distribution. The technology frontier at a certain point in time is the set of best ideas available
to produce the given set of goods, and the average productivity of the technology frontier
determines the per-capita income level. A larger economy has more ideas, more ideas imply that
the best available technologies are more productive, and this allows the economy to sustain a
higher income level. This entails a scale e⁄ect in levels so that income per capita y is increasing
with population L, y = ￿L￿, where ￿ and ￿ are positive constants. Jared Diamond￿ s main
argument in his book Guns, Germs and Steel can be interpreted as saying that this scale e⁄ect
from sharing ideas is what allowed large "Eurasia" to attain a superior level of productivity
(Diamond, 1997). For the present purposes, the relevant implication is that a country can
achieve a level of income that is much lower in isolation than sharing ideas with the rest of the
world.
A scale e⁄ect of the kind just described is the key element in quasi-endogenous growth
models, as it implies that the growth rate is proportional to the growth rate of population,
g = ￿gL. This implication allows for a simple calibration, which reveals the magnitude of the
gains from openness (in steady state levels). With g = 1:5% and gL = 4:8%,2 the equation
g = ￿gL implies that ￿ = 0:31, which in turn implies that a country with 1% of the world￿ s
population enjoys gains from openness equal to 320% (1000:31 = 4:2).
To quantify the gains from openness and explore the role of trade in generating these gains,
it is necessary to have a model that is quantitatively consistent with both the observed growth
rate and the observed trade volumes. I build on Eaton and Kortum￿ s (2001) model of trade
and growth, which can be seen as an extension of Kortum (1997) to incorporate trade. A key
parameter in this model, ￿, determines the variability of the distribution of the quality of ideas.3
2The rate of growth of y is the rate of growth of income per worker after subtracting the contribution from
increases in average human capital and in the capital-output ratio (see Jones, 2002, and Klenow and Rodr￿guez-
Clare, 2005). The value for gL comes from the rate of growth of researchers in the G5 countries (West Germany,
France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan) from 1950 to 1993, see Jones (2002). Note that
this is signi￿cantly higher than the 1:1% rate of growth of population observed in the OECD in the last decades
because of an increasing share of the population devoted to research. Doing this exercise with a lower gL would
lead to even larger gains from openness.
3In Eaton and Kortum (2001) the quality of ideas is distributed Pareto with parameter ￿. Thus, the variance
of this distribution increases as ￿ falls. I instead follow Alvarez and Lucas (2005), who ￿ ip this parameter
3If ￿ is calibrated to match the gravity equation, as is done in Eaton and Kortum (2002), then
a puzzle emerges in that the implied growth rate is almost an order of magnitude lower than
the one we observe for the OECD countries in the last decades. Alternatively, if ￿ is calibrated
to match the observed rate of growth in the OECD, then the model generates too much trade,
since the pattern of comparative advantage is too strong and dominates the estimated trade
costs.
One way to deal with this puzzle is by allowing for di⁄usion of ideas across countries.4 To
understand why di⁄usion makes it possible to match both the gravity equation and the growth
rate, note that the excessive volume of trade generated by the high ￿ needed to match growth of
1:5% per year is dampened when countries can share ideas through di⁄usion rather than trade.
Introducing di⁄usion into the model leads to a gravity equation with a discontinuous border
e⁄ect (i.e., trade falls discontinuously as trade costs increase from zero) that is not present in
Eaton and Kortum (2001, 2002). Estimating ￿ from this equation leads to ￿ = 0:22 rather than
Eaton and Kortum￿ s ￿ = 0:12, and this helps to increase the model￿ s implied growth rate from
g = 0:29% to g = 0:53%. But this is still signi￿cantly below the observed g = 1:5%.
To increase the model￿ s implied growth rate without a⁄ecting its trade implications, I allow
for progress and di⁄usion in ideas that are relevant for non-tradable goods. I refer to these ideas
as "NT ideas" to di⁄erentiate them from the ideas associated with tradable goods, which I will
call "T ideas." Analogously to the role played by ￿ for T ideas, a parameter ￿ determines the
variability of the distribution of the quality of NT ideas. One can then use ￿ = 0:22 to match
the gravity equation, and ￿ = 0:2 so that the model generates g = 1:5%.5 Having this model
that is quantitatively consistent with observed growth and trade volumes, I can then calculate
the gains from openness and the role of trade in these gains. The main result is as stated
above: the gains from openness are large (206%￿240%), while the gains from trade are in fact
smaller than in the model without di⁄usion (13% ￿ 24% rather than 41%).6 These results are
around and have a higher ￿ increase the variability of the quality of ideas.
4An alternative approach is to allow for knowledge spillovers as a way to accelerate the rate of growth of
ideas (I thank Sam Kortum for suggesting this possibility). In a previous version of this paper I explored a
model with such spillovers and calculated the corresponding gains from openness and the role of trade. The
results are very similar to the ones I present below.
5In the calibrated model the growth rate is g = (￿=2 + ￿)gL. Thus, ￿ = 0:22 and ￿ = 0:2 together with
gL = 4:8% imply g = 1:5%.
6These gains from openness di⁄er from the ones calculated above for the simple calibration to observed
growth (i.e., 320%) because the model developed in the paper and its calibration incorporate frictions in the
di⁄usion process that lower the gains from openness.
4derived for the case in which there are no trade costs, so these computed gains are an upper
bound of the actual gains. An alternative calibration allows for such costs and computes the
gains from openness and trade for a set of 19 OECD countries. The results imply that Finland,
which accounts for roughly 1% of the world￿ s research in the calibrated model, has gains from
openness of 174% and gains from trade of 9%. The average of the corresponding gains for the
19 countries considered are 143% and 9%.
This paper is related to the literature on trade and endogenous growth associated with
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), among others. This group
of papers showed that trade or international knowledge spillovers could lead to a higher growth
rate thanks to the exploitation of scale economies in R&D at the global level. This is essentially
what Jones (1995) called a "strong scale e⁄ect," whereby larger markets exhibit higher growth
rates. Jones￿empirical analysis showed that such a strong scale e⁄ect is not consistent with the
data, however, so there has been a shift towards quasi-endogenous growth models, where the
growth rate is not a⁄ected by scale variables. In this paper I focus on this class of models and
explore the quantitative implications of openness on steady state income levels.
Another related literature is the one that focuses on international technology di⁄usion. The
closest paper is by Eaton and Kortum (1999), who develop and calibrate a model of technology
di⁄usion and growth among the ￿ve leading research economies. These authors then perform
a counterfactual analysis to see the implications for the U.S. of detaching itself from sharing
ideas with the rest of the world. Using the quasi-endogenous growth model due to Jones
(1995), Klenow and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2005) performed a similar exercise and found enormous
gains from openness for small countries. This paper can be seen as an extension of this literature
to include trade into the model and thereby quantify the gains from openness arising from both
trade and di⁄usion.
Finally, Coe and Helpman (1995), Keller (1998) and others reviewed in Keller (2004) study
the role of trade as a vehicle for "international R&D spillovers." The idea is that by import-
ing intermediate and capital goods, a country bene￿ts from the R&D done in the exporting
countries. This is a key feature of the model of R&D and trade in Eaton and Kortum (2001)
as well as the model I present in this paper. But here such R&D spillovers are interpreted as
gains from trade, whereas technology di⁄usion is a term reserved for the more narrow concept
of information ￿ ows that allow countries to directly use technologies created elsewhere. In other
words, the gains from international R&D spillovers in Coe and Helpman (1995) are here simply
5measured as gains from trade. A di⁄erent notion is that trade accelerates the international
￿ ow of technical know-how (see Grossman and Helpman, p. 165). Several papers have explored
this empirically with mixed results (see Rhee et. al., 1984, Aitken et. al., 1997, and Clerides
et. al., 1998, and Bernard and Jensen, 1999). This phenomenon is not captured in the model
presented below.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I lay out the basic model
with T ideas and no di⁄usion to introduce the basic notation and assumptions, and to establish
a benchmark against which to compare the results of the full model. In this section I also
show that if ￿ is calibrated to match trade volumes then the implied growth rate is too low.
In Section 3 I present the full model, which builds on the model of Section 2 by adding both
technological progress in the production of non-tradables through the introduction of NT ideas,
and di⁄usion for both T ideas and NT ideas. In this section I derive analytical results for the
gains from openness and the gains from frictionless trade. I establish the result discussed above
that trade and di⁄usion are substitutes, and show that this implies that the gains from trade
are lower than in a model with no di⁄usion. In section 4 I calibrate the model to match trade
volumes and the observed growth rate, and in Section 5 I use the calibrated model to quantify
the gains from openness and the role of trade. Section 6 explores the impact of transportation
costs on the gains from trade and openness. The ￿nal section o⁄ers concluding comments and
topics for future research.
2 Trade and growth without di⁄usion
In this section I ￿rst present a model of trade and growth without di⁄usion based on Eaton
and Kortum (2001). I then calibrate an enriched version of the model to compute the gains
from trade and the implied growth rate.
2.1 A model of trade and growth
There is a single factor of production, labor, I countries indexed by i, and a continuum of
tradable intermediate goods indexed by u 2 [0;1]. The intermediate goods are used to produce
a ￿nal consumption good via a CES production function with an elasticity of substitution ￿ > 0.
The productivity with which individual intermediate goods are produced (i.e., output per unit
of the labor) varies across intermediate goods u and across countries, and this gives rise to
6trade. Let us focus on a single country for now so that we can momentarily leave aside the use
of country subscripts. It is convenient to work with the inverse of productivity. To do so, let
x(u) be a parameter that determines the cost of producing intermediate good u. In particular,
let the cost of producing such a good be given by x(u)￿w, where w is the wage level. Note that
the parameter ￿, which will be constant across goods and countries, magni￿es the variability of
the cost parameter x on the actual cost structure across goods and countries. This parameter
will be crucial in the analysis that follows.
At any point in time the cost parameters x(u) are the result of previous research e⁄orts in
each country. Following Kortum (1997) and Eaton and Kortum (2001), research is modeled
as the creation of ideas, although for simplicity here I assume that this is exogenous. In
particular, I assume that there is an instantaneous (and constant) rate of arrival ￿ of new ideas
per person. In the concluding section I argue that the main results of the paper should not
change signi￿cantly if research e⁄orts were endogenous.
Ideas are speci￿c to goods, and the good to which an idea applies is drawn from a uniform
distribution in u 2 [0;1]. Since this interval has unitary mass, then at time t there is a prob-
ability R(t) ￿ ￿L(t) of drawing an idea for any particular good, where L(t) is the population
level at time t. This implies that the arrival of ideas is a Poisson process with rate function
￿L(t), so the number of ideas that have arrived for a particular good by time t is distributed
Poisson with rate ￿(t) ￿
R t
0 R(s)ds. Again, since the set of goods has unitary mass, then ￿(t)
also represents the total stock of ideas (applying to all goods) at time t. (From here onwards,
I will suppress the time index as long as it does not cause confusion.) Assuming that L grows
at the constant rate gL (assumed to be common across countries) then in steady state we must
have ￿ = R=gL, so ￿ also grows at rate gL.
Ideas for producing a particular intermediate good di⁄er only in terms of a "quality" para-
meter, and the economy￿ s productivity for intermediate good u is determined by the best idea
available for the production of this good. The quality of ideas is independently drawn from
a distribution of quality which is assumed to be Pareto with support in [1;1] and parameter
one.7;8 Letting x(u) be the inverse of the quality of the best idea that has arrived up to time t
7Kortum (1997) shows that the Pareto assumption for the distribution of quality is necessary for there to be
a steady state growth path.
8Eaton and Kortum (2001) assume that the distribution of quality is Pareto with parameter ￿, whereas
here I assume instead a Pareto distribution with parameter 1, with ￿ being a parameter that expands the cost
di⁄erences across ideas, as in Alvarez and Lucas (2005). The two approaches are equivalent except that the ￿
here is the inverse of Eaton and Kortum￿ s ￿.
7for good u, then it is easy to show that x(u) is distributed exponentially with parameter ￿.9
Transportation costs are of the iceberg type, with one unit of a good shipped from country
j resulting in kij ￿ 1 units arriving in country i. I assume that kii = 1, that kij = kji, and that
the triangular inequality holds (i.e., kij ￿ kilklj for all i;j;l).
2.1.1 Equilibrium
Following Alvarez and Lucas (2005), I relabel goods by x ￿ (x1;x2:::xI) rather than u. The
















, then pi(x) = si(x)￿. From the properties of the ex-




j  ij and  ij ￿ (wj=kij)
￿1=￿ ￿j (1)





1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) > 0;11 we get
pmi = CT 
￿￿
i (2)
where CT = ￿[1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]1=(1￿￿), with ￿() being the Gamma function.
To determine wages we introduce the trade-balance conditions. As shown by Eaton and
Kortum (2002), the average price charged by any country j in any country i is the same, and
hence the share of total income in country i spent on imports from country j, Dij, is equal to
the share of goods for which country j is the lowest cost supplier in country i. In turn, this
share is equal to the probability that (wj=kij)x￿
j = minlf(wl=kil)x￿
lg. From the properties of the
9Letting q represent the quality of ideas, then Pr(Q ￿ q) = H(q) = 1￿1=q. Letting v be the quality of the best
idea that has arrived up to time t, then using ex ￿
P1







e￿￿=v, and hence x ￿ 1=v ￿ exp(￿). There is a discrepancy in that here v ￿ 1 (because q ￿ 1) whereas the
exponential distribution has range in [0;1[. As shown by Kortum (1997), this can be safely ignored because
quality levels below one become irrelevant as ￿ gets large.
10These properties are: (1) if x ￿ exp(￿) and k > 0 then kx ￿ exp(￿=k); and (2) if x and y are independent,
x ￿ exp(￿) and y ￿ exp(￿), then minfx;yg ￿ exp(￿ + ￿).
11The assumption that 1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) > 0 entails ￿ < 1 + 1=￿. In principle, I could explore whether this
inequality holds given estimates of ￿ and given the values of ￿ that I will discuss in the text below. In practice,
however, the empirical value of ￿ depends on the level of aggregation that we use for inputs, which in turn
should be determined by the level at which technologies di⁄er in the way speci￿ed in the model. Thus, the
restriction 1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) > 0 must be taken as an assumption for now.
8exponential distribution, this probability is Dij ￿  ij= i. Given that total income in country




The previous conditions determine a competitive equilibrium. In particular, a competitive
equilibrium at any point in time is a couple of vectors pm = (pm1;pm2;:::;pmI) and w =
(w1;w2;:::;wI) such that, together with the vector ( 1; 2;:::; I) that satis￿es equations (1)
and (2) and Dij ￿  ij= i, the trade balance conditions (3) are satis￿ed.
2.1.2 Growth and the gains from trade
I now turn to the implications of the model for growth and the gains from trade. Once we
choose a numeraire, wages are constant in steady state since all ￿i are growing at the same rate
gL. The growth rate in real wages is then given by the rate of decline in pmi. But from (2) it
is clear that pmi falls at rate ￿gL, so the growth rate of real wages or consumption is
g = ￿gL (4)
This is a simple version of Kortum (1997). Note in particular that growth of income per capita
depends on the growth rate of population (the hallmark of quasi-endogenous growth models)
and that a higher ￿ implies a higher growth rate. The reason for this positive role of ￿ is that a
high ￿ magni￿es the bene￿t of high-quality ideas and this is the mechanism that fuels growth
in this model.
The gains from trade are determined by the increase in the real wage, wi=pmi, as a country
goes from autarky to trade. In calculating these gains here and in the following sections I
primarily focus on the case of frictionless trade because this allows for simpler derivations
and because this establishes an upper bound for the gains from trade. In autarky  i = w
1=￿
i ￿i.
Plugging into (2) and using ￿i = Ri=gL yields wi=pmi = C
￿1
T (Ri=gL)￿. Similarly, with frictionless






. Assuming ￿i = ￿, it is easy to show that there






Since they generate a smaller share of the world￿ s best ideas, smaller economies have more
to gain from integrating with the rest of the world. Moreover, a high ￿ leads to higher gains
9from trade. As explained in the Introduction, the reason for this is that a high ￿ increases
the variability of cost di⁄erences across countries and hence leads to a stronger pattern of
comparative advantage.
2.2 Towards a quantitative model
I now enrich and calibrate the model to explore its quantitative implications. Following Eaton
and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2005), I introduce two modi￿cations. First, it
is assumed that intermediate goods are used in the production of intermediate goods, thus
generating a "multiplier" e⁄ect that expands the gains from trade and the growth rate. Second,
it is assumed that production of the consumption good uses labor directly and not only through
intermediate goods. This is done to capture the existence of non-tradables that dampen the
gains from trade. In the model of this section (but not in the one of Section 3) this will also
reduce the growth rate because technological progress is con￿ned to tradable intermediates.
These two modi￿cations are illustrated in Figure 1 and captured formally as follows. The
intermediate goods are used to produce a "composite intermediate good" with a CES production
function with elasticity ￿, so that pmi - which above was the price index of the consumption
good - is now the price index of this composite good. In turn, the composite good together with
labor are used to produce intermediate goods with a Cobb-Douglas production function with
labor share ￿. One can think of an "input bundle" produced from labor and the composite
intermediate good that is in turn used to produce all the intermediate goods. The cost of the




mi where B ￿ ￿
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿1, while the cost of
intermediate good u in country i is now xi(u)￿ci. Finally, the consumption good is produced
from the composite intermediate good and labor with a Cobb-Douglas technology with labor
share ￿. Thus, the price of the consumption good is pi = Aw￿
i p
1￿￿
mi , where A ￿ ￿￿￿(1￿￿)￿￿1.
Note that if ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0 then we are back to the model above. The individual intermediate
goods are the only tradeable goods.
These modi￿cations do not substantially a⁄ect the qualitative results above; the only dif-
ference is that now the wage wi must be substituted by the unit cost of the input bundle, ci,
in the de￿nition of  ij in equation (1).12 But there are important quantitative implications. In
12As shown by Alvarez and Lucas (2005), the trade balance conditions are not a⁄ected by the values of ￿ or
￿ (at least for the case in which there are no tari⁄s, as here).









































If intermediate goods have a high share in the production of intermediate goods (i.e., high 1￿￿),
so that there is a large multiplier 1=￿, then the growth rate will be higher. Similarly, the growth
rate increases with the share of intermediate goods in the production of the consumption good













The key parameters of the model are ￿, ￿, ￿, and gL. Eaton and Kortum (2002) estimate
￿ from the gravity equation generated by the model together with bilateral import and price
data for the OECD countries. They focus on the way in which ￿ determines the impact of trade
costs on trade volumes. To isolate this aspect of the gravity equation, Eaton and Kortum focus
on "normalized trade ￿ ows." Let the normalized bilateral imports of country i from country j






Taking logs, and letting mij ￿ ln(Dij=Djj) and ￿ij = ln(pmj=pmikij), then
mij = ￿(1=￿)￿ij (7)
11Eaton and Kortum (2002) construct mij from 1990 data on trade and production of manufac-
tures for 19 OECD countries and ￿ij from data on prices from the UN ICP 1990 benchmark
study, which gives retail prices for 50 manufactured products in these countries.13 An OLS
regression with no intercept yields ￿ = 0:12.14
Alvarez and Lucas (2005) calibrate the parameters ￿ and ￿ to match the fraction of U.S.
employment in the non-tradables sector and the share of labor in the total value of tradables
produced, respectively. They ￿nd ￿ = 0:75 and ￿ = 0:5. For gL I could use the growth rate of
population in the OECD over the last decades, which is gL = 1:1%. But as Jones (2002) has
emphasized, there has been an upward trend in the share of people devoted to R&D in rich
countries over the last decades. According to Jones, the rate of growth of researchers has been
4:8% over the period 1950-1993 in the G-5 countries.15 Plugging these values in equation (5)
together with Eaton and Kortum￿ s ￿ = 0:12 yields g = 0:29%, which is signi￿cantly lower than
the observed rate of growth of productivity in the OECD countries, which is close to g = 1:5%.
One could, of course, calibrate ￿ to match the observed growth rate, but this would lead to
inconsistent implications for the role of gravity in trade. In particular, bilateral trade volumes
would decline too slowly as trade costs increase.
Turning to the gains from trade, these parameters (￿ = 0:12, ￿ = 0:75, and ￿ = 0:5)
imply from (6) that the gains from frictionless trade for a country with 1% of the world￿ s total
population are 1000:06 = 1:3, or 30%.16 If instead we use the "central value" of ￿ in Alvarez
and Lucas (2005), namely ￿ = 0:15, then the gains from trade are 41%, as mentioned in the
Introduction.
13The 19 countries included in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
14The OLS estimation yields 1=￿ = 8:03 with a standard error of 0:15. The R-squared is 0:06. A simple
method of moments estimation of 1=￿ in (7) yields basically the same outcome (see Eaton and Kortum, 2002).
15The G5 countries are France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan. Clearly,
an increasing share of people engaged in research implies that the system is not in steady state, but the system
can still attain a constant growth rate where these formulas are valid (see Jones, 2002).
16Note that if ￿i = ￿j for all i;j then with frictionless trade wages are equal across countries, so a country
with 1% of the population also has 1% of the world￿ s GDP. For convenience, I used this case to refer to the
gains from trade in the Introduction.
123 Di⁄usion, trade and growth
In this section I extend the previous model to introduce international di⁄usion of ideas and
make it quantitatively consistent with the observed growth rate and trade volumes. First, I
allow for technological progress in the production of non-tradables. In particular, I assume that
just as there are ideas that increase the productivity of tradable intermediate goods, there are
ideas that increase the productivity of non-tradable consumption goods. I will refer to the ￿rst
type of ideas as "T ideas" and to the second type of ideas as "NT ideas." (I will suppress the
T and NT labels except when necessary to avoid confusion.) Second, I allow for international
di⁄usion of both types of ideas. The introduction of NT ideas into the model is necessary to
have the model match the observed growth rate, whereas di⁄usion of both T and NT ideas is a
key mechanism for the gains from openness that I want to explore. Moreover, as will be shown,
di⁄usion of T ideas helps to make the model better match the trade data.
To model the role of NT ideas, I assume that there is a continuum of non-tradeable consump-
tion goods indexed by v 2 [0;1]. These goods enter the representative consumer￿ s instantaneous
utility through CES preferences with elasticity of substitution ￿.17 They are produced from
labor and the composite intermediate good with a Cobb-Douglas production function at cost
Az(v)￿w￿p1￿￿
m , where z(v) is a cost parameter associated with good v. Analogously to the way
in which T ideas determine the cost parameters x(u) for intermediate goods, z(v) is the inverse
of the quality of the best NT idea that has arrived for good v. Note that the parameter ￿
plays the same role in a⁄ecting the cost of non-tradeable consumption goods as the parameter
￿ plays in a⁄ecting the cost of the tradeable intermediate goods.
The generation and di⁄usion of T and NT ideas is assumed to be identical, so I suppress the
T and NT labels for now. I assume that the world is composed of two regions: the North and
the South. To simplify, I take the South to be a single economy, whereas the North contains
I countries. I denote the set of north countries by ￿N and similarly use ￿S to denote the
(unitary) set of South countries. I use index i for north countries and the indexes j and l for
all countries (i.e., i 2 ￿N and j;l 2 ￿N [ ￿S).
Only countries in the North generate ideas. Ideas at ￿rst are "national" (as in the previous
section), but then di⁄use to other north countries, from which they ￿nally di⁄use to the South.
Thus, there are I +2 pools of ideas: one pool for each north country, a pool of ideas that have
17The assumption that the elasticity of substitution is the same here as in the production of the composite
good is made to minimize notation and plays absolutely no role in the results.
13di⁄used among the north countries (the "north ideas"), and the pool of ideas that have di⁄used
to the South. Ideas in the latter pool are available in all countries, so I refer to these ideas as
"global ideas."
Following Krugman (1979) and Eaton and Kortum (2006), I assume that di⁄usion is proba-
bilistic, with each idea having a constant probability of di⁄using. Let ￿ be the rate of di⁄usion
among countries in the North and let ￿
0 be the rate of di⁄usion from the pool of north ideas
to the pool of global ideas. Letting ￿N and ￿G be the stocks of ideas in the north and global
pools, respectively, then _ ￿i = ￿iLi ￿ ￿￿i, _ ￿N = ￿
P
￿i ￿ ￿
0￿N, _ ￿G = ￿
0￿N. In steady state the
stock of national ideas in north country i is
￿i = (￿i=(gL + ￿))Li (8)
while the stock of north ideas is
￿N = e ￿
X
￿i (9)
where e ￿ ￿ ￿=(￿
0 + gL). Finally, the stock of global ideas in steady state is
￿G = ￿
0￿N=gL (10)
All these stocks of ideas grow at rate gL in steady state.
3.1 Equilibrium
Let us ￿rst focus on consumption goods. Since they are non-tradable then we care only about
the best idea available in each country, irrespective of whether they are national ideas or not.
That is, for north country i the cost parameter for a consumption good is associated with the
best idea across the pools of national ideas in i, north ideas and global ideas. This implies that
the cost parameter in north country i for any consumption good is distributed exponentially
with parameter ￿i + ￿N + ￿G. Similarly, the cost parameter for a consumption good in the
South is determined by the best global idea and is distributed exponentially with parameter
￿G. In equilibrium, consumption goods are sold at cost, hence the price of consumption good
v is Az(v)￿w￿p1￿￿










14Since z(v) in north country i is distributed exponentially with parameter ￿i + ￿N + ￿G, then
(assuming that 1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) > 0 so that the integral above is well de￿ned) we have that the





mi CNT (￿i + ￿N + ￿G)
￿￿ (11)
where CNT ￿ ￿(1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿))1=(1￿￿). The price index for the South is given by a similar
expression with ￿i + ￿N + ￿G replaced by ￿G.
Turning to intermediate goods and trade, note that for each good there are n best national
ideas (one for each north country), a best north idea, and a best global idea. Recalling that
xi(u) denotes the cost parameter for the best national idea in country i for intermediate good
u, and using xN(u) and xG(u) to denote the cost parameters associated with the best north
and global ideas for this good, respectively, then we can now label intermediate goods by
e x = (x1;x2;:::;xI;xN;xG). Consider the di⁄erent ways in which a country l could procure a
particular good e x. Just as in the previous section, country l could buy this good produced with






i necessarily belongs to ￿N). But now it can also buy goods produced with di⁄used ideas: it
can buy goods produced in any of the I north countries with north ideas, and it can buy goods
produced in any of these countries plus the South with global ideas. The cost of buying a good
produced in country i with the best north idea is (ci=kli)x￿
N, so the minimum cost of buying a





. Similarly, the minimum cost of buying a





(note that this minimization now includes
the possibility that the good is produced in the South, j = S). Letting e cl ￿ minj fcj=kljg and
e cN
l ￿ mini fci=klig, then the price of good e x in country l is now



















Given the properties of the exponential distribution, ￿l is distributed exponentially with
parameter









￿N + (e cl)
￿1=￿ ￿G (12)
This parameter determines the price index for intermediate goods in country l. In particular,
and analogous to (2), we now have
pml = CT ^  
￿￿
l (13)
15Wages are determined by the trade-balance conditions, as in (3), but the trade shares are
now di⁄erent. To determine these shares, note that (ci=kli)
￿1=￿ ￿i =^  l is the share of goods
which country l can procure most cheaply from i produced with i0s best national ideas. The
fact that l may also buy north and global goods from i establishes that
Dli ￿ (ci=kli)
￿1=￿ ￿i =^  l for i 2 ￿N (14)
To proceed, let MN
l ￿ argmini fci=klig denote the set of countries from which country l would
buy all goods produced with north ideas (i.e., if country l buys a good produced with a north
idea, it must be buying this good from i 2 MN
l ). Obviously, ci=kli = e cN
l if i 2 MN
l . The share
of goods that country l will actually buy from countries i 2 MN
l produced with north ideas


























Finally, let Ml ￿ argminj fcj=kljg denote the set of countries from which l would buy all goods
produced with global ideas. If the South were the unique member of Ml then country l would
buy all goods produced with global ideas from the South, and then
DlS = (cS=klS)
￿1=￿ ￿G=^  l
In this case (15) would have to be satis￿ed with equality. If there are north countries in Ml,
however, then country l will import from these countries goods produced with national, north










￿i + ￿(Ml \ ￿N)￿N + ￿G
!
(16)
where ￿(Ml \ ￿N) = 1 if Ml \ ￿N 6= ? and ￿(Ml \ ￿N) = 0 otherwise.
The competitive equilibrium is determined by the vectors pm = (pm1;pm2;:::;pmI;pmS)
and w = (w1;w2;:::;wI;wS) such that together with the vector (^  1; ^  2;:::; ^  I; ^  S) that satis￿es
equations (12) and (13) and the matrix fDjl;j;l = 1;2:::;I;Sg that satis￿es (14) ￿ (16), the
trade-balance conditions (3) are satis￿ed.
16In steady state wages are constant, so the common growth rate is given by g = ￿_ pl=pl. But
















The growth rate is composed of two terms: the ￿rst term, ￿(1￿￿
￿ )gL, is associated with techno-
logical progress in tradeable (intermediate) goods, whereas the second term, ￿gL, is associated
with technological progress in non-tradeable (consumption) goods. It is worth noting that the
￿rst term is exactly the same as in the model with no di⁄usion of the previous section (see
equation (5)). This reveals that di⁄usion has no e⁄ect on steady state growth in this model; as
will become clear below, there is only a level e⁄ect.
3.2 Gains from trade and di⁄usion
I now turn to the derivation of the gains from trade and di⁄usion of both T and NT ideas.
As in the previous section, I consider the gains from frictionless trade. To do so, I ￿rst derive
the real wage for the case of no trade (with and without di⁄usion), and then for the case of
frictionless trade with di⁄usion. I then compare these wages to establish the gains from trade
and di⁄usion, and discuss several implications from these results.
3.2.1 No trade
When there is no trade, the price index of intermediate goods in country l, pml, is given by (13)
but with
^  l = c
￿1=￿
l ￿l
where ￿l is the stock of ideas in country l. For each north country i, this stock is composed of
ideas originated in i and foreign ideas that have di⁄used (i.e., foreign ideas that have become





(1 + ￿=gL)￿l if no di⁄usion and l 2 ￿N
0 if no di⁄usion and l 2 ￿S
￿l + ￿N + ￿G if there is di⁄usion and l 2 ￿N
￿G if there is di⁄usion and l 2 ￿S
(18)
From (13) we get pml=wl = (BCT)
1=￿ ￿
￿￿=￿
l . (Note that if there is no di⁄usion, then this
expression is not well de￿ned for the South since in that case ￿l = 0.) From (11) we ￿nally get







Turning to the characterization of the equilibrium under frictionless trade, it is convenient to
introduce the notions of "national i goods," "north goods," and "global goods" (this is relevant
only for intermediate goods). National i goods are those for which the best idea is a national
idea in country i (i.e., xi = argminfxg); north goods are those for which the best idea is a
north idea (i.e., xN = argminfxg); and global goods are those for which the best idea is a
global idea (i.e., xG = argminfxg).
Thanks to di⁄usion and the fact that trade is frictionless, the equilibrium may entail wage
equalization across all countries. In this case all countries produce global goods and all north
countries produce north goods. If di⁄usion is not too strong, then wage di⁄erences arise between
North and South, and even among north countries. For example, the equilibrium could exhibit
an inferior wage in the South, with wage equalization only among north countries. In this
equilibrium all north countries produce north goods, and only the South produces global goods.
If North-North di⁄usion is weak relative to di⁄erences in research intensities across the North
then wage di⁄erences would arise among north countries. In this case, there would be a group
of north countries with the highest research intensities specializing in the production of their
"national goods," with wages determined by each country￿ s research intensity (as in Eaton and
Kortum, 2002, and Alvarez and Lucas, 2005), and then a group of north countries with the
lowest research intensities sharing a common wage and producing north goods. The wage in
the South could be the same as this "low north wage" or it could be lower still. In the later
case, all global goods would be produced in the South.
To simplify the exposition, I will focus on the equilibrium with two wage levels: a low wage
in the South and a common wage for north countries. This equilibrium is possible even if the
research intensity di⁄ers among north countries: thanks to di⁄usion, north countries with low
research intensities can specialize in north goods and attain trade balance in spite of the fact
that their stock of national ideas per person is relatively low. The key for this equilibrium
con￿guration is that all north countries produce north goods. Under frictionless trade, this





for all i 2 ￿N, so that there is indi⁄erence about where to buy north goods. I refer to this
18condition as the ECN condition. Since under frictionless trade we have pml = pm for all l, then
this condition entails wi = wN for all i.
In equilibrium, country i will at least supply the whole world of national i goods. Using (8),
(9), and (10), and letting Ri ￿ ￿iLi and RN ￿
P




￿i + ￿N + ￿G) =
Ri=RN
1 +e ￿ + ￿
0=gL
Given the absence of trade costs and the ECN condition, this is also the share of each country￿ s
total spending that will be allocated to buying national i goods from country i. Letting ￿N ￿
RN=LN (with LN ￿
P
i Li) be the average research intensity in the North, then a condition
necessary for an equilibrium with wage equalization among north countries is
￿i=￿N ￿ 1 +e ￿ (20)
This inequality ensures that - given the ECN condition - every north country has some resources
left over for producing north goods. This requires that ￿i=￿N be not too high, for otherwise
there would be a country that would have so many national goods that it would not be able to
satisfy the world demand for its national goods given the ECN condition, and the equilibrium
could not take the form that I have postulated here. Note that the condition is relaxed as e ￿
increases. This is because a higher ￿ implies that a lower share of goods are national goods.
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For the conjectured equilibrium with wS < wN we then need the following condition:
￿ ￿ gLLS=LN or ￿ > gLLS=LN together with ￿
0 <
LS (gL + ￿)gL
￿LN ￿ gLLS
(22)
The ￿rst inequality or the second and third inequalities together imply that the stock of global
ideas is too low, so wS=wN < 1.
If conditions (20) and (22) are satis￿ed, then there is an equilibrium of the form that I have
conjectured (i.e., wage equalization in the North and wS < wN). For future reference, note
that as di⁄usion increases then wages in South and North become equalized (i.e. wS = wN).
19Formally, if ￿ > gLLS=LN then there exists a ￿ ￿
0 such that wages are equalized if ￿
0 ￿ ￿ ￿
0.
Similarly, if ￿
0 > gLLS=LN then there exists a ￿ ￿ such that wages are equalized if ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.18
Similarly, wages become equalized for any non-zero ￿ and ￿
0 if South is su¢ ciently small.













j ￿j + ￿N + (wS=wN)
￿￿=￿ ￿G
￿￿(1￿￿)=￿
(￿i + ￿N + ￿G)
￿
(24)















3.2.3 Gains from di⁄usion and frictionless trade
The overall gains from openness for north country i can be seen as the increase in the real
wage from the case with no trade and no di⁄usion to the case with di⁄usion under frictionless
trade.19 From (19) with ￿i = (1 + ￿=gL)￿i and (24), and using the expressions for ￿i, ￿N and















where ri ￿ Ri=RN is the share of worldwide research done by i. The ￿rst term captures the
gains associated with North-North trade of intermediate goods and di⁄usion of T ideas; the
second term captures the gains from trading with the South; and the ￿nal term captures the
gains from di⁄usion of NT ideas. Clearly, countries that account for a smaller share of worldwide
research have more to gain from openness. Moreover, as long as ￿
0 is not too low, then ￿ ! 1
implies that wN = wS and hence GOi ! r
￿￿(1￿￿)=￿￿￿
i . Since ￿(1 ￿ ￿)=￿ + ￿ = g=gL, this
coincides with the simple logic pursued in the Introduction to compute the gains from openness
18These values for ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿
0 are de￿ned by 21 for wS=wN = 1.
19It is worth emphasizing that in the model there are no transition dynamics since both the bene￿ts from
trade and di⁄usion take place instantaneously. Thus, the increase in the real wage from isolation to openness is
the appropriate measure of the welfare gains from openness.
20as a pure scale e⁄ect in a quasi-endogenous growth model. Of course, if di⁄usion is ￿nite, then
the gains from openness would be smaller than what this simple calculation suggests.
What is the contribution of trade to these gains from openness? The problem in decomposing
the overall gains from openness into the contributions of trade and di⁄usion (of T ideas) is that
these two channels are substitutes, in the sense that if one is present then the other one is less
important. To see this, it is best to start with an extreme case in which trade and di⁄usion
of T ideas among north countries are perfect substitutes. Consider the case in which ￿i = ￿
for all i (symmetry) and again let ￿ ! 1 (with ￿
0 not too low). Assume also that ￿ = 0 (no
NT ideas) to simplify the exposition. Recall that the stock of ideas originated in country i is
Ri=gL. Thus, if all countries shut down di⁄usion it is easy to show that the real wage under





On the other hand, ￿ ! 1 implies that for all i we have ￿i +￿N +￿G ! RN=gL, so using (19)
we see that under autarky but with di⁄usion the real wage is also given by (27). Thus, in this
extreme case, the contribution of di⁄usion is zero when there is trade, and the contribution of
trade is zero when there is di⁄usion. The general result under normal conditions (i.e., trade
is costly and di⁄usion is ￿nite) is that trade and di⁄usion are substitutes in the sense that
if there is di⁄usion (trade) then the gains from trade (di⁄usion) are lower than if di⁄usion
(trade) is not present. Intuitively, imports allow a country to bene￿t from foreign ideas that
have not yet di⁄used, and di⁄usion allows a country to bene￿t from foreign ideas even without
trade; di⁄usion acts as a substitute for trade in the international exchange of ideas among north
countries. Another way to state this is that shutting down trade leads a country to rely more
on di⁄usion and this attenuates the resulting losses.
This result implies that it is to some extent arbitrary to decompose the overall gains from
openness into separate contributions of trade and di⁄usion. But it is still meaningful to ask
how a country would lose by shutting down trade. Equivalently, we can ask how a country
gains by going from a case with di⁄usion and autarky to a case with di⁄usion and frictionless
trade. The result can then be compared to the calculated gains from trade in a model without
di⁄usion (as in Section 2) and to the overall gains from openness. This entails comparing (19)
















Countries with a lower share of worldwide research gain more from trade. Moreover, the gains
from trade for north countries are increasing in wN=wS, as this reduces their relative cost of
procuring global goods. This implies that an increase in the size of the South enlarges the
gains from trade for the North. This is a standard terms of trade e⁄ect. The result in (28)
also shows that, holding wN=wS constant, an increase in the rate of North-South di⁄usion ￿
0
increases the gains from trade for the North. Of course, as shown in (21), an increase in ￿
0
increases the South￿ s relative wage. Thus, an increase in ￿
0 has two opposite e⁄ects on the
North￿ s gains from trade: on the one hand, it allows more goods to be produced cheaply in the
South, which is bene￿cial to the North, but on the other hand this generates a terms of trade
loss for north countries. If ￿ is not too low then GTi behaves like an inverted U with respect
to ￿
0: when di⁄usion is low then higher di⁄usion bene￿ts the North, and the opposite occurs
when di⁄usion is high.20 Thus, the gains from trade for north countries may either increase
or decrease as North-South di⁄usion increases. If this relationship is positive, then we can say
that North-South di⁄usion and trade behave complements.
We can now explore further the implications of di⁄usion for the gains from trade by studying
the impact of ￿ on GTi. Consider ￿rst the case in which wages are equalized between North
and South. The result that trade and di⁄usion are substitutes can be appreciated clearly in
this case by noting from (28) (with wN=wS = 1) that GTi decreases with ￿. Another way to
see this is to note from the ￿rst term of (26) that the joint gains from trade and di⁄usion of T
ideas among north countries are r
￿￿(1￿￿)=￿
i , which does not depend on ￿. Since the real wage
in the North increases under autarky with ￿, then necessarily GTi will decrease with ￿.
Consider now the case in which there is no wage equalization between North and South.
Again, there are two opposite e⁄ects, because an increase in ￿ lowers the gains from North-
North trade but ￿if ￿ is su¢ ciently small ￿it increases the North￿ s gains from trading with
20This just entails di⁄erentiating the expression for GTi w.r.t. ￿
0 and noting that this derivative is positive for
￿
0 = 0 and negative for ￿
0 close to the value at which wages are equalized (which exists as long as ￿ > gLLS=LN).
By continuity, there exists a value of ￿
0 at which the derivative of GTi w.r.t. ￿




0. Simple math shows that the second derivative of GTi w.r.t. ￿
0 evaluated at ￿
0
0 is negative, estalishing
the inverted U shape of GTi w.r.t. ￿
0. If ￿ ￿ gLLS=LN then wages do not become equalized even for high ￿
0,
so GTi may be always increasing in ￿
0.
22the South. Thus, with no wage equalization between North and South, it is conceivable that
higher North-North di⁄usion leads to higher gains from trade in north countries.
Turning now to the gains from trade for the South (the gains from openness are not well
de￿ned because under isolation the stock of ideas in the South is zero, implying zero income).











If wS = wN then GTS is decreasing in both ￿ and ￿
0, implying that trade and di⁄usion are
substitutes for the South. In the general case, we again have con￿ icting e⁄ects: on the one
hand, di⁄usion implies that the South has less to gain from the North because in a sense it
already has many of the North￿ s technologies, but on the other hand higher di⁄usion implies
an improvement in the terms of trade for the South, leading to higher gains from trade with
north countries. It is easy to show that GTS behaves like an inverted U with respect to either
￿ and ￿
0: when di⁄usion is low, the terms of trade e⁄ect dominates, whereas for high di⁄usion
the substitution e⁄ect dominates.
4 Calibration
To explore the quantitative implications of the model, I need to choose values for the parameters
￿, ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿ and ￿
0. I also need to choose a reasonable value for LN=LS, as this pins down the
relative wage wN=wS, which is necessary to determine the gains from trade. Again, I follow
Alvarez and Lucas (2005) and set ￿ = 0:75, and ￿ = 0:5. To assign a value to ￿ I use a procedure
that is similar to Eaton and Kortum (2002), but amended to account for the e⁄ect of di⁄usion.
In particular, I assume that trade among north countries can be seen as an equilibrium outcome
of the model presented in the previous section (with trade costs) for the particular case in which
there is no trade among north countries in north goods. That is, I think of the trade data as
coming from the equilibrium of the model for a set of research intensities and trade costs for
which each north country satis￿es its own demand for north goods with domestic production.
I refer to this as the NTNG condition. Recalling the de￿nition e cN
l = mini fci=klig, the NTNG
condition entails e cN
i = ci for all i.
One case in which the NTNG condition is satis￿ed entails a common research intensity
across north countries. To gain some intuition for this result, consider the case of frictionless
23trade. With a common research intensity in the North, the absence of trade costs implies that
in equilibrium all north countries have the same wage and the same unit cost for the input
bundle, i.e. ci = cj for all i;j 2 ￿N. In turn, this implies that in equilibrium one can have
every north country satisfy its own demand for north goods. If trade costs are positive, then a
fortiori the NTNG condition will be satis￿ed. In Appendix A I prove this result for parameters
￿ and ￿ that satisfy 1=￿ > (1 ￿ ￿)=￿ (a condition satis￿ed in the calibration below) under
common research intensities (i.e., ￿i = ￿j for i;j 2 ￿N).
The assumption of a common research intensity across north countries is only necessary
for the NTNG condition to be satis￿ed for any structure of trade costs kij. Alternatively, one
could assume a simple structure of trade costs with kij = k for all i 6= j, and then ￿nd the
upper bound ￿ k(￿1;￿2;:::;￿I;L1;L2:::LI;LS) such that if k ￿ ￿ k(￿1;￿2;:::;￿I;L1;L2:::LI;LS)
then the NTNG condition to is satis￿ed given a vector of research intensities and country
sizes (￿1;￿2;:::;￿I;L1;L2:::LI;LS). Clearly such an upper bound for k exists since the NTNG
condition is satis￿ed for k close to zero (see Appendix A).
I now assume that the combination of research intensities, country sizes and trade costs
are such that the NTNG condition is satis￿ed. Although clearly this is not an appropriate
characterization for the whole world, it is a reasonable assumption to characterize trade among
the richest countries. I also assume that e cl ￿ minj fcj=kljg = cS=klS for all l, so that the South
produces all global goods. Applying the equilibrium characterization derived in the previous
section to the case with e cN
i = ci for all i (NTNG) and e cl = cS=klS for all l we see that now the
price index of intermediate goods in north country i is given by




e  i =
X
j





￿1=￿ ￿j if i 6= j and j 2 ￿N
c
￿1=￿
i (￿i + ￿N) if i = j
(cS=kiS)
￿1=￿ ￿G if j = S
(31)
Trade shares are given by Dij = e  ij=e  i. The relationship between normalized import shares






This is similar to the (normalized) gravity equation in (7) except that now there are source-
country ￿xed e⁄ects. These e⁄ects are more important for small countries (i.e., mij is more
24negative when RN=Rj is higher) because in such countries an important part of domestic
production is related to north goods, which are not exported to other north countries. This
decreases the imports by any country from small countries in relation to (or normalized by)
those countries￿domestic purchases.
Using the same data on trade volumes and trade costs as Eaton and Kortum (2002), and 1990
R&D employment as a proxy for aggregate research levels Rj and RN in (32), I estimated e ￿ and
￿ from this equation using non-linear least squares among 19 OECD countries and gL = 0:048.21
Both parameters are precisely estimated. The estimate of 1=￿ is 4:57 with a s.e. of 0:32 while
the estimate of e ￿ is 0:13 with a s.e. of 0:03.22 Note that this implies ￿ = 0:22, signi￿cantly
higher than Eaton and Kortum￿ s ￿ = 0:12.
It is worth pausing here to better understand what determines the value of e ￿ in this proce-
dure. Equation (32) implies that smaller countries should have lower normalized exports to any
other country. This relationship between size as measured by Rj=RN and normalized exports is
what should be pinning down e ￿ in the estimation. To see whether this is indeed the case, I ran
a linear regression of mij on ￿ij with source-country dummies and compared the exponential of
the (negative of the) estimated coe¢ cients for the dummies (which I denote zj) with RN=Rj.
As shown in Figure 2, there is clear positive relationship between these two variables.23 This
suggests that smaller countries do have lower normalized exports, and that the estimated e ￿ in
the NLS procedure above is capturing this relationship.
The higher value of ￿ helps the model better match the observed growth rate even with
no technological progress for consumption goods: imposing ￿ = 0 in (17) and using ￿ = 0:75,
￿ = 0:5 and gL = 4:8%, the implied growth rate would now be g = 0:53% rather than
g = 0:29% obtained in the model without di⁄usion. But this is still signi￿cantly below the
observed g = 1:5%. I now set ￿ to match this growth rate in (17). This yields ￿ = 0:2. It is
reassuring to note that this value for ￿ is very close to the value for ￿ estimated above from an
entirely di⁄erent procedure.
21The R&D employment data comes from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database arranged by
the World Bank.
22These are robust standard errors. There are 342 observations, and the R-squared is 0:2. The same regression
but with no intercept - as in the case of no di⁄usion - yields an R-squared of 0:06, whereas a simple OLS regression
with an intercept yields an R-squared of 0:16. Similar results are obtained if instead I use total population or
GDP as proxies for Ri.
23A linear regression of zj on RN=Rj yields an estimated slope coe¢ cient of 0:26 with a s.e. of 0:09. The
outlier is Australia: this country￿ s high z means that it has low normalized exports ￿a characteristic of small
countries (high RN=Rj) ￿in spite of being a large country as measured by a low RN=Rj.
25The last step is to calibrate ￿ and ￿
0. Eaton and Kortum (1999) calculate di⁄usion lags from
international patent data and ￿nd an average mean di⁄usion lag of ten years among the ￿ve
leading economies. This may signi￿cantly understate the di⁄usion lag for all ideas conducive
to trade, however, because only a small subset of technologies are patented and it is reasonable
to expect that those technologies are precisely the ones that are likely to di⁄use rapidly.24
Comin, Hobijn and Rovito (2006) estimate di⁄usion lags for several technologies. They ￿nd
median di⁄usion lags that range from 8 years for the Internet to 74 years for cars. Since the
average di⁄usion lag for ideas among rich countries is 1=￿, then it seems reasonable to consider
￿ 2 [0:01;0:1], with the corresponding value of ￿
0 adjusted to keep e ￿ = ￿=(￿
0 + gL) = 0:13.25
To apply the formula for the gains from openness in (26) I need a value for the wage in the
North relative to the South under frictionless trade. For each value of ￿ 2 [0:01;0:1] I adjust the
relative size of the North (LN=LS) so that under frictionless trade it accounts for 75% of world
GDP (i.e.
wNLN
wNLN+wSLS = 3=4) given the relative wage in (21).26 The assumption here is that
the North￿ s share of world GDP would not be too di⁄erent under frictionless trade compared
to the case with actual trade barriers. Figure 3 depicts wN=wS for ￿ 2 [0:01;0:1]. The highest
value of wN=wS is attained for the case with the lowest rate of di⁄usion: ￿ = 0:01 implies
wN=wS = 2. This reveals that the model is not able to generate large TFP di⁄erences across
countries; such di⁄erences would have to come from the international variation in the e⁄ective
quantity of resources (L in the model) per worker.
An important implication is that wages become equalized across North and South for ￿ ￿
0:024. In this case, the North would produce some global goods, which is not consistent with
the equilibrium that I considered for the calibration of ￿ and e ￿, where I assumed that all global
goods were produced in the South. Thus, for the analysis below I consider only the restricted
range ￿ 2 [0:01;0:024]. For such values of ￿ wages satisfy wS < wN and the South produces all
global goods.
24See for instance Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000).
25The reader may worry about the implication of low rates of di⁄usion for the existence of national scale
e⁄ects. That is, one could expect that if ￿ is low then small countries would be less productive than large ones
because of a smaller stock of ideas. Although trade would greatly reduce such scale e⁄ects for T ideas, this
would not help for NT ideas. But this is only a problem if one assumes that consumption goods are tradable
across all points within a country. A more reasonable assumption is that such goods are non-tradable across
national subregions. Under these conditions scale e⁄ects would not arise at the national level.
26This is the share of worldwide GDP accounted for by the 19 OECD countries used by Eaton and Kortum
(2002) in their estimation of ￿. The GDP data comes from the WDI, World Bank, average 1994-2000 (taken
from Alvarez and Lucas, 2005).












Figure 2: Source country dummies (z, vertical axis) versus size (RN=Rj, horizontal axis)









. Rate of North-North diffusion (delta)
Figure 3: Relative wage for the North wN=wS for di⁄erent values of ￿
275 Gains from trade and di⁄usion: quantitative results
I now use the parameters calibrated in the previous section to compute values for the gains
from openness and the gains from frictionless trade for a country that does 1% of the world￿ s
total research. I then generalize to countries with di⁄erent shares of world research.
Applying the formula in (26) yields gains from openness for a country with ri = 1% that
range between 206% to 240% (i.e., GOi 2 [3:06;3:4]) as ￿ increases from 0:01 to 0:024. Figure
4 shows these gains (GO) as well as the ￿rst and third terms of GOi in (26) ￿the second term
is not shown because it too small relative to the other terms in the ￿gure. The ￿rst term, GO1,
measures the gains from trade and di⁄usion of T ideas between north countries, whereas the
third term, GO3, measures these countries￿gains from North-North di⁄usion of NT ideas. The
overall gains from openness are large relative to the gains from openness in the model without
di⁄usion (see Section 2). Partly, this is a result of the gains from di⁄usion of NT ideas (GO3),
which ranges from 80% to 104% as ￿ increases from 0:01 to 0:024. But this also comes from the
increase in the estimated value of ￿ when di⁄usion is allowed into the model, as can be veri￿ed










Rate of North-North diffusion (delta)
Figure 4: Gains from Openness (GO), Gains from North-North Trade and Di⁄usion of T ideas
(GO1), and Gains from North-North Di⁄usion of NT ideas (GO3) for di⁄erent values of ￿.
What is the role of trade in generating these gains? Applying (28) we ￿nd that the gains
from trade for a country with ri = 1% range from 23:7% to 13% as ￿ increases from 0:01 to
0:024, as illustrated in Figure 5. These gains seem small compared to the large overall gains
28from openness calculated above. They are also smaller than the gains from trade that would
arise in a model without di⁄usion. In this case, and with symmetric research intensities (i.e.,
￿i = ￿ for all i), then GTi = 1:66. An important implication is that although di⁄usion brings
about gains from trade with the South, these extra gains are dominated by the substitutative
property between North-North trade and di⁄usion; in other words, although in theory trade









Rate of North-North diffusion (delta)
Figure 5: Gains from Trade (GT) under di⁄erent values of ￿
The previous calculations have been made for the case of ri = 1%. Figure 6 shows similar
results for a range of di⁄erent levels of r for ￿ = 0:01.28 This relatively low rate of di⁄usion is
chosen to be on the conservative side regarding the gains from openness and to allow for higher
gains from trade. Figure 7 shows the relationship between the gains from trade in this model
and the gains from trade in the Alvarez and Lucas model (i.e., ￿ = 0:15 and no di⁄usion). The
result presented above for ri = 1% that the gains from trade in the model with di⁄usion are
lower than the AL model remains valid as long as r is not too high; for very large countries
27To see this in more detail, consider an intermediate situation with di⁄usion but no wage di⁄erences between
North and South. Imposing wN = wS in (28) we get GTi 2 [1:126;1:207]. This reveals that the gains from trade
drop from 66% to between 12:6% and 20:7% as we introduce di⁄usion but retain wage equalization; allowing for
wage di⁄erences between North and South increases the gains from trade only slightly. Thus, di⁄usion decreases
the gains from trade in spite of the fact that it leads to "new" gains from trading with the South.
28Again, the second term of GOi in (26) ￿which corresponds to the gains from North-South trade ￿is not
plotted because it is too small relative to GO1 and GO3 (GO2 = 1:025 for any ri).
29(i.e., r ￿ 10%), the larger ￿ in the model with di⁄usion dominates, leading to higher gains from
trade than in the AL model.









Size: share of world research (r)
Figure 6: Gains from Openness (GO), Gains from North-North Trade and Di⁄usion of T ideas
(GO1), and Gains from North-North Di⁄usion of NT ideas (GO3) against size (r) for ￿ = 0:01.
Finally, I turn to the gains from trade for the South (the gains from openness are not well
de￿ned because its income is zero under isolation). Applying (29) reveals that GTS goes from
1:23 to 1:55 as ￿ increases from 0:01 to 0:024. The gains from trade for the South become larger
as di⁄usion raises: this implies that the improvement in the South￿ s terms of trade dominates
the substitution e⁄ect as ￿ and ￿
0 increase and LN=LS is recalibrated to keep the North￿ s share
of world GDP.
6 Gains from trade and openness under transportation
costs
How are the gains from trade and openness a⁄ected by transportation costs? How do these
gains di⁄er across OECD countries? To answer these questions, in this section I undertake
an alternative quantitative exercise. First, I assume that ￿ = ￿ and calibrate this common
parameter to match the observed growth rate. From (17) this yields ￿ = ￿ = 0:21, which is
close to the values ￿ = 0:22 and ￿ = 0:2 estimated in Section 4 and used to derive the results
of Section 5. Second, I assume that ￿i = Li, with Li measured by the number of researchers







Size: share of world research (r)
Figure 7: Gains from Trade in the Model with Di⁄usion and the AL Model against size (r) for
￿ = 0:01.
in country i. And third, instead of matching the way in which trade costs a⁄ect trade volumes
(gravity equation), I assume that kij = k = 0:75 for i 6= j, and choose values for e ￿ and LS so
that the simulated equilibrium (see below) matches the share of the South in world GDP (25%)
and the average import share of the 19 OECD countries considered above (30%), while having
the South produce all goods with global technologies (as in the calibration of Section 4).29;30
In particular, I set ￿ = 0:01, e ￿ = 0:18 and LS =
P
i Li. Note that e ￿ = 0:18 is not too di⁄erent
from the estimated value in Section 4 (i.e., e ￿ = 0:13).
To compute the gains from trade and openness in the presence of trade barriers, I need to
compute equilibrium real wages in an equilibrium with trade barriers and then compare them
to the real wages in isolation and autarky derived above. The algorithm I use to compute the
equilibrium is an extension of the one developed by Alvarez and Lucas (2005) for an economy
without di⁄usion. As explained in Appendix A, one element of the equilibrium concerns the way
in which South allocates its expenditures of goods produced with North technologies ("North
goods") across North countries. This allocation is captured by the vector x = (x1;x2;:::xI),
where xl is the share of South expenditures on North goods bought from country l. The vector x
29Alvarez and Lucas (2005) use k = 0:75 as a compromise between the low values estimated in gravity
equations and direct estimates of transportation costs (freight charges plus the time costs of cargo in transit).
30The data on total imports and GDP is from the WDI, World Bank, for the average of 1994 - 2000 (Alvarez
and Lucas, 2005).
31belongs to the I-dimensional simplex (i.e., x 2 ￿I) and in equilibrium must satisfy the following
"complementary slackness" conditions: 1) if xi;xj > 0 then ci=kSi = cl=kSj, 2) if xi = 0 and
xj > 0 then ci=kSi ￿ cj=kSj. Appendix B explains the algorithm to compute x together with
the rest of the equilibrium.
The results are illustrated in Figures 8 and 9, and Table 1 contains the full simulation
results. South buys North goods from all North countries except the two largest countries,
U.S. and Japan, which have the highest wages and unit costs. Figure 8 shows that the model￿ s
implied imports to GDP ratios line well against the data (the outlier is Belgium). Figure 9
shows how gains from openness vary with country size; New Zealand exhibits gains above 290%.
More importantly, the average gains from trade among North countries are 9%, whereas the
average gains from openness are 143% (Table 1). Not surprisingly, the gains from trade and
openness are smaller than those calculated under frictionless trade, and the result that GO are
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Figure 8: Imports/GDP in the model and data against country size
7 Conclusion
Countries bene￿t from openness to the rest of the world in many di⁄erent ways. Trade and
di⁄usion are surely two of the most important channels for the realization of these bene￿ts.











Size: Share of World Income
Figure 9: Gains from Openness vs Size
Table 1: Results for simulations for k = 0.75, ￿ = 0.01, e ￿ = 0.18, Ls =
P
Li. (1) is for model
results and (2) for data.
Country Wage Unit cost x Income (1) Income (2) M/GDP (1) M/GDP (2) GT GO
Australia 0.55 1.07 7.6% 1.6% 1.3% 31% 17% 1.09 2.12
Austria 0.55 1.07 2.6% 0.5% 0.7% 32% 35% 1.10 3.06
Belgium 0.55 1.07 3.6% 0.7% 0.9% 32% 73% 1.09 2.75
Canada 0.55 1.07 10.1% 2.3% 2.1% 30% 33% 1.09 1.90
Denmark 0.55 1.07 2.5% 0.4% 0.6% 32% 35% 1.10 3.11
Spain 0.55 1.07 6.6% 1.3% 1.9% 31% 26% 1.09 2.23
Finland 0.55 1.07 3.6% 0.7% 0.4% 32% 34% 1.09 2.74
France 0.55 1.07 12.9% 3.9% 4.9% 29% 24% 1.08 1.66
U.K. 0.55 1.07 12.7% 3.7% 4.3% 29% 28% 1.08 1.68
Germany 0.56 1.07 12.7% 6.0% 7.4% 27% 27% 1.07 1.49
Greece 0.55 1.07 1.6% 0.3% 0.4% 32% 19% 1.10 3.59
Italy 0.55 1.07 7.8% 1.6% 3.9% 31% 25% 1.09 2.10
Japan 0.59 1.08 0.0% 16.7% 15.7% 21% 8% 1.05 1.22
Netherlands 0.55 1.07 5.0% 1.0% 1.3% 31% 48% 1.09 2.46
Norway 0.55 1.07 2.4% 0.4% 0.5% 32% 36% 1.10 3.11
New Zealand 0.55 1.07 1.6% 0.2% 0.2% 32% 26% 1.10 3.91
Portugal 0.55 1.07 1.9% 0.3% 0.4% 32% 34% 1.10 3.36
Sweden 0.55 1.07 4.8% 0.9% 0.8% 31% 39% 1.09 2.49
USA 0.62 1.09 0.0% 32.5% 28.0% 16% 10% 1.03 1.11
North 0.55 1.07 ... ... 75.0% 30% 30% 1.09 2.43
South 0.20 0.62 ... 25.0% 25.0% 28% ... 1.06 ...
33Building on Eaton and Kortum (2001, 2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2005) I developed a model
of trade and di⁄usion where growth is caused by technological progress in tradable and non-
tradable goods. Calibrating the model to match the trade data and the observed growth rate
I then computed the model￿ s implied gains from openness and the gains from trade. The main
result is that the gains from openness are quite large, whereas the gains from trade are even
smaller than in the model without di⁄usion.
One concern is that the analysis implicitly assumes that the ￿ ow of ideas is independent of
the volume of trade. Perhaps trade has a much larger role precisely through a positive e⁄ect on
di⁄usion. This could happen through several channels, such as ￿ ows of ideas arising from the
interaction between nationals and foreigners via trade, the competitive pressure from imports
inducing domestic ￿rms to engage in faster technology adoption, or complementarities between
foreign technologies and foreign inputs.31 There is a large empirical literature exploring the
signi￿cance of these and similar mechanisms through which trade may induce productivity
growth in domestic ￿rms.32 This is an important topic for future research.
A limitation of the model concerns the way in which di⁄usion is captured. There are at
least three speci￿c tasks ahead. First, assuming simultaneous di⁄usion, so that national ideas
become available in all rich countries and then globally, is clearly unrealistic. It seems important
to model di⁄usion according to the qualitative and hopefully quantitative features found in the
data (see for example Ja⁄e and Trajtenberg, 1999, Keller, 2002, and Comin et. al. 2006) and
explore the implications of this for growth and trade.
Second, FDI is surely one mechanism through which di⁄usion takes place. Ramondo (2006)
has already shown a way to model FDI within the Eaton and Kortum framework when there is
no trade. The next step is to have a model with trade, FDI and (pure) di⁄usion and quantify
the gains from each of these channels separately. Including migration into such a model would
be another worthwhile step.
Finally, this paper has ignored the importance of di⁄erences across countries in technology
adoption. One conjecture that would be interesting to explore is that countries with lower rates
of technology adoption have less to gain from di⁄usion and more to gain from trade, with lower
31We tend to see countries that are closed to trade also being closed to foreign ideas (e.g., North Korea). But
this empirical association between trade and di⁄usion does not imply any causal role for trade in accelerating
di⁄usion.
32See for instance Rhee et. al. (1984), Aitken et. al. (1997), Clerides et. al. (1998), Bernard and Jensen
(1999), Hallward-Driemeier et. al. (2002), Tybout (2003), Atkeson and Burstein (2007).
34overall gains from openness.
A ￿nal remark concerns the assumption that research e⁄orts are exogenous. How would
the results change if this assumption were relaxed? In the simplest model with no di⁄usion
of T ideas, as in Eaton and Kortum (2001), trade does not a⁄ect countries￿research intensity
(i.e., the share of the labor force devoted to research). The reason for this is the standard
one that although trade expands the market for ideas, it also increases competition, and these
two e⁄ects exactly balance out. This implies that, to a ￿rst approximation, the gains from
trade would not be a⁄ected by having endogenous research e⁄orts. Something similar happens
with the gains from di⁄usion. To see this, consider the extreme case in which di⁄usion is
instantaneous (no frictions to the international di⁄usion of ideas, i.e. ￿;￿
0 ! 1) and research
productivities are equal across north countries (i.e., ￿i = ￿ all i). Shutting down di⁄usion would
imply larger returns to ideas in the home market, but would prevent the exploitation of ideas
in foreign markets. As shown in Eaton and Kortum (2006), these two e⁄ects exactly cancel
out, so di⁄usion has no e⁄ect on innovation. This discussion suggests that the results obtained
here with exogenous research e⁄orts would not be signi￿cantly a⁄ected by the extension to
endogenous research. Still, a thorough analysis of this issue seems worthwhile, and is left for
future research.
35Appendix A
This Appendix shows that equations (30) and (3) with Dij = e  ij=e  i and (31) are part of the
system of equations that characterize the full equilibrium conditions for the case with ￿i = ￿j
for all i;j 2 ￿N and 1=￿ > (1 ￿ ￿)=￿. I restrict attention to a case in which South supplies all
countries with global goods.
The analysis of Section 3.1 shows that for l 6= i and i;l 2 ￿N import shares are given by
Dli = e  li=e  l = (ci=kli)







where b ￿ 1=￿, ￿ ￿ C
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T , and ali ￿ kb
li, whereas for l 2 ￿N we have Dll = ￿c
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l pb
ml (￿l + ￿N).
Also, imports from the South are related to DlS = ￿c
￿b
S pb
mlalS￿G. On the other hand, for




l 2 argminfcj=kSjg we have DSl = ￿c
￿b
l pb
mSaSl(￿l + xl￿N), where xl is the share of goods
produced with north ideas that country l supplies to South. The vector x = (x1;x2;:::xI) is in
the I-dimensional simplex (i.e., x 2 ￿I) and satis￿es the following "complementary slackness"
conditions: 1) if xj;xl > 0 then cj=kSj = cl=kSl, 2) if xj = 0 and xl > 0 then cj=kSj ￿ cl=kSl.




Using these results, the trade balance condition (i.e.,
P
j LjwjDji = Liwi) for country















mSasi (￿i + xl￿N) = Liwi (33)











mS￿G = LSwS (34)
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mi , equations (33 ￿ 36) characterize the equilibrium as long as
ci ￿ cj=kij for all i;j 2 ￿N (37)
I will refer to this as the NTC condition. In the rest of this Appendix A I show that a solution
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The second step is to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2 If xi = 0 and xj ￿ 0 then pb
miaij ￿ pb
mj.






















Using (35) to substitute for ￿pb












l ￿l + c
￿b
























l ￿l + c
￿b















































































































































































Now, suppose by contradiction that pb
mj < aijpb
mi. Lemma 1 then implies cb
j < cb
iaij, so given
















This is a contradiction with the above equation and hence establishes that pb
miaij ￿ pb
mj.
Lemma 3 If xi = 0 and xj ￿ 0 then cb
iaij ￿ cb
j.







































































iaij. But we know


































































ij , so cb
iaij ￿ cb
j.




i. If xi = 0 and xj > 0 then
this lemma implies that cb
iaij ￿ cb
j. The property cb
jaij ￿ cb











kSi = cj, hence cb
i ￿ cb
jaij. Finally, if xi;xj > 0


















i, and similarly we can show cb
iaij ￿ cb
i. Thus, we have shown that for any
xi;xj ￿ 0 we have both cj ￿ ci=kji and ci ￿ cj=kij, which shows that the NTC condition is
satis￿ed.
This completes the proof of the Proposition. In the rest of this Appendix I consider the
case in which kij = k (aij = a) for all i;j but ￿i 6= ￿j and derive an upper bound for k such
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mS(￿l + xl￿N) (40)
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40then cl=cj ￿ 1=k for all l;j 2 ￿N, so the NTC condition is satis￿ed.
Appendix B
This Appendix explains the algorithm to solve for the equilibrium of the economy in the
presence of trade barriers. The case I consider is one in which there is NTNG among north
countries, while South supplies all countries with global goods. I assume that kSl = klS = kS,
but this is purely for convenience. Given a vector x, then one can solve the system forgetting
about the complementary slackness conditions by following an extension of the algorithm in
Alvarez and Lucas (2005). This is as follows: ￿rst, there is a function pm(w) that solves for
pm given w. Second, there is a mapping w0 = T(w;x) whose ￿xed point, w = F(x), gives the
equilibrium wages given x.
The ￿nal step is to solve for the equilibrium x. Let c(x) be the vector of unit costs





let G(x) = argminx0 x0c(x). Also, let ’(x) = G(x)c(x)=xc(x) and H￿(x) = ’(x)￿x + (1 ￿
’(x)￿)G(x) for ￿ 2 N. Note that if e x is a ￿xed point of H￿(x) then e x 2 G(e x), which implies
that e x satis￿es the complementary slackness conditions. The algorithm to ￿nd the equilibrium
x is to start with G(0) and then iterate on x0 = H￿(x) until ’(x) is su¢ ciently close to one.
A higher value of ￿ makes convergence faster, but too high a value leads to oscillation and no
convergence. A value ￿ = 3 worked ￿ne and led to ’(x) in less than 500 iterations.
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